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Defending the NLRB:   
Improving the Agency’s Success in the  
Federal Courts of Appeals 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch 
Commentators have made innumerable recommendations to improve 
the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB or Board) administration of 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).1  Yet one subject that has been 
largely ignored in these discussions is the fact that no matter how good the 
administrative enforcement of the NLRA is, or could be, it will mean very 
little if the NLRB cannot defend its decisions in the courts of appeals.2 
Virtually all measures that would improve the NLRB’s overall admin-
istrative effectiveness would also have a positive impact on the agency’s 
success in the courts of appeals.  However, the focus of this article is more 
narrow, as it addresses reforms intended to directly improve the willingness 
of courts of  appeals to enforce NLRB decisions. 
Although the NLRB suffers at times from a reputation as an inept 
agency, that reputation is often unjustified, particularly with regard to the 
success rate of its decisions before the federal courts of appeals.  For     
instance, in Fiscal Year 2009, the Board had sixty-one cases decided by 
appellate courts.3  Out of those cases, approximately 78.7% were enforced 
in full, 4.9% enforced with modifications, 6.6% remanded in full, 4.9% 
partially affirmed and partially remanded, and 4.9% set aside in full.4  This 
                                                                                                                           
  Jeffrey M. Hirsch is Associate Professor at University of Tennessee College of Law and Visit-
ing Associate Professor at Vanderbilt University Law School.  Professor Hirsch is indebted to Fred 
Jacob, Meredith Jason, Anne Marie Lofaso, Kira Vol, Dennis Walsh, Peter Winkler, and participants at 
Florida International University College of Law’s Whither the Board?: The National Labor Relations 
Board at 75 Symposium for their extremely helpful input.  Professor Hirsch also thanks Justin Faith, 
Tamra Jordan and Laura Robinson for their research assistance.  Much of the insights of this article are 
the result of Professor Hirsch’s prior experience as an attorney in the NLRB’s Appellate Court Branch 
from 2000 to 2004. 
 1 See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations Act 
without Statutory Change, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Improving]. 
 2 Some exceptions include James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protec-
tions and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 973 (1996), and Joan Flynn, The Costs and 
Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 
387, 442-43 (1995). 
 3 74 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 147 (2009). 
 4 Id. at 147-48.   
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success is typical of other years and shows that courts are far more likely to 
approve of the NLRB’s decisions than disapprove.5  Moreover, this win rate 
is roughly in line – albeit a bit lower – with other labor and employment 
agencies that engage in significant levels of adjudication.6  Thus, it does not 
appear that the Board is performing substantially worse than other agencies.  
That does not mean, however, that it cannot still perform better than it does 
now. 
Indeed, although the NLRB’s overall rate of success is not            
problematic, much of that success is due to the large percentage of straight-
forward cases that the Board hears.  Of more concern are the more conten-
tious cases – ones that involve highly contested facts or controversial rules.  
There is little empirical evidence that looks specifically to the Board’s suc-
cess in those cases, but the evidence that does exist suggests that the Board 
is not receiving the deference that one might expect for an administrative 
agency.7  Judges often seem not to respect the Board or, at a minimum, have 
no hesitation reversing a decision with which they have the slightest disa-
greement.  Ways in which the Board might be able to reverse this trend is 
the focus of this article. 
The stakes of this inquiry are high.  Because the NLRB cannot enforce 
its own orders, any losing party can delay compliance with a Board order 
by seeking review before an appellate court.8  This delay itself can substan-
                                                                                                                           
 5 The Fiscal Year 2009 success rate is an improvement over the Board’s overall averages (from 
July 5, 1936 to September 30, 2009), in which it had 12,107 cases decided by the federal courts of 
appeals, and approximately 66.5% were enforced in full, 12.9% enforced with modifications, 5.0% 
remanded, 2.3% partially affirmed and partially remanded, and 13.3% set aside.  Id. at 147.  However, it 
is in line with the Board’s average over the previous five fiscal years, in which it had 279 cases decided 
by the federal courts of appeals, and approximately 78.8% were enforced in full, 6.5% enforced with 
modifications, 4.8% remanded, 3.1% partially affirmed and partially remanded, and 6.8% set aside.  Id. 
at 148. 
 6 For instance, over the period covering Fiscal Years 2004-2009, the NLRB had 78.80% of its 
cases affirmed in full by appellate courts.  74 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 148 
(2009).  Other agencies’ win rates – as determined by searches on Westlaw – over that same period of 
time include: the Federal Labor Relations Authority (56.4%); the Department of Labor’s Benefit Review 
Board (83.27%); the Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board (91.2%); and the Merit 
Systems Protection Board (85.56%).  These comparisons are limited in what they can show given differ-
ences in the number and type of cases, but they illustrate that the NLRB is not an outlier among adjudi-
catory labor and employment agencies.  
 7 James Brudney has studied all circuit court review of NLRB decisions over an earlier time 
frame and noted areas in which the courts – especially the D.C. Circuit – are particularly likely to re-
verse the Board, such as cases involving affirmative bargaining orders.  See Brudney, supra note 2, at 
1012. 
 8 However, most NLRB decisions are not appealed.  For instance, a rough approximation of the 
appeals rate in Fiscal Year 2008 is 31%, which is based on 330 contested cases decided by the NLRB 
over that time period, with 103 cases assigned to the Appellate Court Branch over the same period 
(sixty-three of those from appeals by the losing party; forty referred by the NLRB Regional Office 
because the losing party failed to comply with the NLRB order).  73 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL 
 
2010] Defending the NLRB: Improving Success on Appeal 439 
 
tially undermine employees’ labor rights – particularly when a case in-
volves representational issues, in which employees’ support for a union 
often diminishes as time passes.9  Yet the problems associated with delay 
are exacerbated if losing parties believe they have a good chance of       
winning before the courts.  Although some parties may challenge a Board 
order no matter their chances, others may seriously weigh the costs and 
benefits of further litigation.  For these parties, the prospect of reversing a 
Board order may lead to additional challenges, more delay, and ultimately 
an inability of employees to enjoy their labor rights. 
Many factors contribute to the Board success vel non in the appellate 
courts.  However, it must be acknowledged that one of the most significant 
factors is out of the Board’s control.  Although there are disagreements 
about the extent to which judges’ beliefs influence their decisionmaking,10 
there is little doubt that the judiciary’s views on labor law influence the 
outcome of NLRB cases.11  The impact of judges’ beliefs can be overstated, 
but the NLRB has little room to maneuver if it tries to defend a close case 
before judges who appear to disagree fundamentally with the purpose of the 
NLRA.12  This article will note some reforms that may convince even these 
judges to side with the Board more than they do now, but the primary focus 
will be on reforms over which the Board has more control. 
These reforms include attempting to improve the format and substance 
of NLRB decisions, increasing the emphasis on the standard of review, con-
sidering limited types of forum shopping, increasing the use of rulemaking, 
reducing delay, and requesting more injunctive relief.  None of these strate-
gies, if enacted, would be a silver bullet that would solve all of the difficul-
                                                                                                                           
YEAR 2008, at 14 (2009); NLRB General Counsel Issues   Report On   2008   Operations  7,  available 
at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Press%20Releases/2008/R-2675.pdf. 
 9 See James Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Chang-
ing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 832 (2005); Michael Harper, The Case for Limiting Judicial Re-
view of Labor Board Certification Decisions, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262, 264-65 (1987); see also Kate 
Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-Contract Campaigns: Implica-
tions for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 78-79 (Shel-
don Friedman et al. eds., 1994) (describing win rate declining from 50% if election occurs within 50 
days after election petition, to 31% if election occurs 61-180 days later), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/18/. 
 10 Compare Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief 
Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REV. 805, 851 (1999), with Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and 
Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1998).  
 11 See Brudney, supra note 2, at 1019-20 (describing courts’ willingness to reverse the Board in 
certain areas as primarily the result of differing views on what the NLRA should mean, particularly 
courts’ emphasis on employee free choice). 
 12 This is not to say that such judges eschew their responsibility to apply the law; indeed, the 
NLRB’s overall success rate indicates that this happens often.  However, it is the controversial or close 
cases in which a judge’s predilection against unionism appears to raise its head most often. 
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ties that the Board faces in court.  In the aggregate, however, they could 
improve the Board’s standing in the eyes of federal appellate courts, thereby 
improving the Board’s long-term success.  Moreover, a renewed focus on 
the need to win before the courts of appeals could enhance the Board’s   
success in the short term by improving some of its individual decisions, 
thereby making them better candidates for court enforcement. 
I.  REFORMING NLRB DECISIONS 
Among the possible means to improve the NLRB’s appellate success, 
perhaps none holds as much promise and covers as many issues as reform-
ing the Board’s actual decisions.  This is perhaps no surprise, as the deci-
sions themselves are what the courts are being asked to accept or reject.  
Unfortunately, the NLRB writes its decisions not with the courts in mind, 
but rather NLRB insiders or experts.  And not merely any labor law junkie; 
rather, NLRB decisions appear most targeted to the readers who existed in 
the 1930s, for its decisions look virtually the same today as they did then.  
Accordingly, updating the form and substance of Board decisions could 
improve their quality, making them more accessible to judicial readers and 
more defensible in court. 
In addition to some of the specific recommendations that follow, one 
general practice that would likely make NLRB decisions more palatable to 
courts would be to give Board-side attorneys appellate court experience.  
The Board could focus on hiring attorneys with appellate experience –
whether with the NLRB or not – or by giving Board-side attorneys tempo-
rary “details” to the NLRB’s Appellate Court Branch.  Nothing would   
cement the need to write easy-to-understand and well-reasoned decisions 
like the experience of having to defend a confusing and poorly reasoned 
one before often hostile judges. 
A. Updating Format of NLRB Decisions 
To observe the problems with NLRB decisions one need go no farther 
than looking at them, as the format of today’s NLRB decisions are virtually 
identical to decisions from 1937.13  This is not a good thing.  Even if the 
                                                                                                                           
 13 To be fair, the NLRB’s decisions have been updated a bit over the last decade or so.  However, 
that improvement still has a long way to go.  See, e.g., Guard Publ’g Co. (The Register-Guard), 351 
N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007) (providing useful introductory summary of decision), enforced in part, 
enforcement denied in part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  Indeed, the format of the very first published 
decision of the NLRB still looks remarkably similar to very recent NLRB decisions.  Compare Pa. 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935), with ABC Indus. Laundry, LLC, Nos. 28-CA-22133, 28-
CA-22219 & 28-CA-22286, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 2010 WL 991195 (Mar. 2, 2010) (summary adoption 
of ALJ decision, which uses the 1935 format). 
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1930s format and structure made sense at one time, it looks foreign to the 
modern reader.  Although cosmetic, this antiquated format makes NLRB 
decisions harder to read and understand, which undermines the Board’s 
ability to communicate to the courts the reasons for its findings.  Most 
judges do not see enough NLRB decisions to feel comfortable with this 
format; the problem is even worse for their less experienced law clerks, 
who are likely to view NLRB decisions as something bordering on a      
foreign language.14  Further, many judges are already perceived as being 
hostile to labor rights, or at least unfamiliar with the realities that many 
employees face, which makes it especially important that the Board present 
its holdings in as clear a manner as possible.15 
The problems with the format of NLRB decisions begin right from the 
start.  Rather than simply describing the basic issues involved in the case, 
an NLRB decision often leads off with administrative boilerplate.16  It may 
then describe or summarily affirm an attached administrative law judge 
(ALJ) recommended decision, while noting – almost always in a footnote – 
certain challenges to the ALJ decision that the Board is rejecting.  Take this 
example of an introduction from one of the Board’s recent cases: 
On September 28, 2009, Administrative Law Judge Burton Litvack    
issued the attached decision.  The Respondent filed exceptions and a 
supporting brief, the General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the        
Respondent filed a reply brief. 
The National Labor Relations Board has considered the judge’s deci-
sion and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs, and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and to 
adopt the Recommended Order as modified. 17 
This example is typical of many NLRB introductions, which is unfor-
tunate because it tells the reader nothing substantive about the case.18     
Indeed, to a reader unaccustomed to Board procedure, this introduction is 
so full of terms of art and other jargon that it borders on meaningless. 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Indeed, my personal conversations with various law clerks about their first experience with 
NLRB decisions usually elicit descriptions such as “goofy” or “bizarre.” 
 15 See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. 
L. & POL’Y J. 221, 239 (2005); Flynn, supra note 2, at 442-43. 
 16 See, e.g., ABC Indus. Laundry, LLC, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 17, at *1. 
 17 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 18 Other introductions will often at least mention the statutory provision allegedly violated and 
perhaps some fact, but the rest of the format is often similar, and the useful information is often buried 
along with a detailed description of the procedural posture.  See, e.g., DPI New England, No. 1-CA-
44833, 354 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 2009 WL 3577752, at *1, 2 (Oct. 30, 2009).  The ALJ’s decisions in these 
cases are generally no better.  See, e.g., ABC Indus. Laundry, LLC, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 17, at *2. 
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A particular problem in this example is that the two sentences quoted 
above are literally the entire Board decision, accompanied only by an order 
and the adopted ALJ decision.  Although this type of “short form” adoption 
of an ALJ decision may be appropriate at times, its format leaves much to 
be desired.  This is especially true given that the ALJ decisions are often 
more confusing than the Board’s.19  What is particularly unfortunate about 
these short form decisions is that when the Board refuses to use them, its 
introductions – at least recently – are markedly better, as they provide some 
information about the legal issue in the case and perhaps some basic facts.20 
The Board should build on these more helpful introductions by ensur-
ing that all cases begin in a way that actually introduces the reader to the 
case.  One recent example is from an ALJ recommended decision, which 
starts: 
In this case the Government alleges that a union has unlawfully        
refused an employer's demand to negotiate a successor labor agree-
ment to replace the parties’ last agreement.  The predecessor agree-
ment, not atypically, was governed by a provision that required 60-
days written notice to amend or terminate to avoid renewal of the 
agreement for one year.  The issue in this case is whether the employer 
provided the union with such notice.  If it did not, then, by its terms, 
the agreement renewed and – pursuant to Section 8(d) of the National 
Labor Relations Act (the Act)1 – the union was not under a statutory 
duty to bargain for a new agreement to take effect before the extended 
renewal date of January 14, 2010.  On the other hand, if the employer 
did provide sufficient notice to the union, the agreement, by its terms, 
terminated January 14, 2009, and the union’s refusal to bargain a suc-
cessor collective-bargaining agreement was, and is, as alleged, a viola-
tion of the duty to bargain, pursuant to Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. 21 
Unlike the previous example, this introduction is helpful to the reader, 
as it sets out the legal issue in question and notes the key factual inquiry, as 
well as the consequences of the alternative arguments regarding that in-
quiry.  Perhaps the only significant improvement that could be made to this 
introduction would be to note the ALJ’s conclusions about the issues     
involved.  
                                                                                                                           
 19 See ABC Indus. Laundry, LLC, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 17, at *2. 
 20 See, e.g., McCarthy Constr. Co., Nos. 7-CA-51474 & 7-CA-51647, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 10, 2010 
WL 454506, at *1 (Feb. 2, 2010). 
 21 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers of Am., Case No. 4-CB-10259, at 1 
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 9, 2009) (ALJ David I. Goldman, decision and order), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/ ALJ%20Decisions/2009/JD-43-09.htm. 
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Another important contrast between the two introductions is that the 
second example uses footnotes only to quote the cited statutory provisions.  
The first example, however, manages to have a total of six footnotes in a 
single sentence.  Although some of the material in these footnotes may be 
deemed inappropriate for the text,22 the information in the others is far more 
substantive than virtually anything else in the text.  For example, the fourth 
footnote contains four long paragraphs in which the Board discusses several 
challenges to the ALJ’s recommendations, a brief discussion of the relevant 
recommendations, and the Board acceptance of some of them and refusal to 
rely on others.  This type of information is what is supposed to constitute 
the decision, not some minor side issue.  By placing virtually all substantive 
information in a footnote, the Board made its decision very difficult to read 
and left the reader with a poor impression of the agency’s competence. 
After the introduction, what might follow is a brief description of the 
Board’s differences with the ALJ.  However, this part of the decision typi-
cally assumes that the reader is aware of the ALJ’s decision.23  As a result, 
the reader must frequently flip back and forth between the two decisions – a 
requirement that not only makes comprehension difficult, but makes the 
reader ill-disposed towards the Board from the beginning.  This problem is 
particularly severe when the ALJ has issued a bench decision, a practice 
that should be completely prohibited, as it often results in extremely diffi-
cult-to-understand fact finding and analysis.24 
In more significant cases, the Board may write a full decision.        
Although better than a full or partial adoption of the ALJ’s decision, these 
can still be difficult to read.  These decisions generally state the facts –   
often with an extremely high degree of specificity – and then, in some    
cases, explain in full the positions of both parties.25  It is only then that the 
Board itself provides its legal analysis.  It is telling that it is not unusual for 
the background material to be longer than the Board’s analysis, presumably 
the most  important  part  of  the  decision.26   This  simple  numerical  fact  
                                                                                                                           
 22 For example, the Board’s statement that it continues to issue two-member decisions or the fact 
that the parties did not object to certain findings might be worthy of a footnote.  However, given that 
reviewing appellate courts rarely use footnotes, there is a good argument to be made that these state-
ments should be in the text as well.  See ABC Indus. Laundry, LLC, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 17, at *1 nn.1-2. 
 23 Id. at 1 n.4. 
 24 See, e.g., Avante of Boca Raton, 334 N.L.R.B. 381, 382-90 (2001). 
 25 See, e.g., Guard Publ’g Co. (The Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1111-14 (2007), 
enforced in part, enforcement denied in part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (discussing facts, ALJ’s 
decision, parties’ arguments, and positions of amici). 
 26 Compare ABC Indus. Laundry, LLC, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 17, at *1-8 (providing NLRB and ALJ 
background), with id. at 1 nn.4 & 8-13 (providing NLRB and ALJ legal analysis). 
444 FIU Law Review [5:437 
 
diminishes the Board’s analysis, because its belabored focus on the back-
ground – particularly the parties’ positions – has exhausted many readers. 
A far better approach would be to adopt the format of court decisions.27  
One obvious advantage is that courts are used to this format and familiarity 
would breed comfort with the Board’s conclusions.  Moreover, courts typi-
cally provide only the facts needed for the reader to understand the decision 
– eliminating the risk of having important facts lost in a swamp of irrele-
vant ones or overlooked by a bored reader. 
It is true that the NLRB, which is technically a fact-finding               
adjudicator, is in a different position than an appellate court and its deci-
sions often need more factual development.  Yet the NLRB is typically not 
in the same position as a district court because the Board does not conduct 
hearings itself – that is the function of ALJs.  The closest parallel is a dis-
trict court’s review of a magistrate judge’s recommended order.  Like in the 
magistrate situation, the initial ALJ decision can be helpful.  It is the ALJ 
who is really responsible for developing the evidence, acting like the     
magistrate judge to a district court or, where there is no magistrate, a district 
court to an appellate court.  ALJ decisions, therefore, are expected to have a 
more thorough factual development.  Consequently, the NLRB should use 
ALJ decisions like appellate courts use district court decisions or like     
district courts use magistrate recommendations.  The Board should give its 
own summary of the relevant facts, knowing that more detail is available in 
the ALJ decision.28  Merely referring to the ALJ decision or replicating its 
detail, makes its decisions far less accessible. 
Reciting in detail each party’s arguments is also overkill.  This is par-
ticularly true because NLRB decisions list those arguments by party, rather 
than by issue.  Thus, appellate judges and clerks must read through a     
detailed description of each party’s arguments, then once the Board finally 
begins its analysis of the issues, repeatedly turn back to those descriptions 
to find each party’s approach to a given issue.29  There are better alterna-
                                                                                                                           
 27 For instance, the ALJ’s decision in NFI Indus. Inc., No. 4-CA-36842, 2010 WL 332166 
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Jan. 8, 2010), although a bit long, reads a lot like a court decision, with a 
substantive summary introducing the case, a brief recitation of the procedural posture and jurisdiction, a 
discussion of the facts, and the analysis compromising the bulk of the decision.  It is perhaps not coinci-
dence that the ALJ, David Goldman, is a former appellate attorney for the Board.  See, e.g., Caterpillar, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 138 F.3d 1105 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 28 The Board would obviously need more explanation if it makes a different factual finding than 
the ALJ. 
 29 It is possible that the Board is attempting to give its decisions a flavor of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking by making the parties’ input to its ultimate decision more explicit.  Yet, given that an NLRB 
decision will always fall far short of formal rulemaking no matter how it characterizes the parties’ argu-
ments, this strategy – if true – has far more costs than benefits. 
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tives to forcing judges to endure this time-consuming and frustrating     
manner of reading a decision. 
For instance, the Board could make parties’ briefs publicly accessible 
and allow ALJs to continue their practice of providing detailed descriptions, 
while the Board merely summarizes the parties’ arguments.  This approach 
could also mirror the format of most appellate courts, which typically 
weave each party’s arguments into the courts’ analyses of a given issue.30  In 
addition to aiding comprehension, and indirectly enhancing respect for the 
Board’s decision, this change could also make the Board more responsive to 
parties’ arguments.  Under its current practice, it appears that after         
describing the parties’ arguments, the Board occasionally leaves them in 
their separate sections and never returns to address them. 
Following its description of the parties’ arguments is the Board’s legal 
analysis.  As a matter of format, there is little more that the Board should 
do, aside from doing more to incorporate the facts and the parties’ conten-
tions into its legal analysis.  Otherwise the format of the Board’s legal anal-
ysis currently resembles that of most appellate courts.  However, there are 
more substantive issues with the Board’s analysis, which are discussed   
below. 
The last step in an NLRB decision is its order, which is one of the 
more effective portions of its decisions.  It is here that the Board lists      
exactly what violations it has found and the remedies, all in a relatively 
easy-to-read format.  Indeed, the first thing I do when reading a Board deci-
sion is to look at the order, as that tells me exactly what the Board found, 
some very basic facts, and how the Board remedied the violations.  The 
problem is that the order is buried somewhere in the document, between the 
decisions of the Board and the ALJ.  The Board instead should provide the 
same, basic information at the start of each case.  It could do so in para-
graph form, as part of the overall introduction to the case.  This introduction 
should explicitly, and simply, state the violations found and complaints   
rejected.31  Simpler cases could also note the remedies, while more complex 
cases could refer the reader to the specific page number where the full 
Board order is located. 
The Board should also eliminate the adoption of ALJ decisions in all 
but the simplest of cases – much like appellate courts’ decision to issue 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See, e.g., Hartman Bros. Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 280 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
 31 As noted, the Board appears to be moving more in this direction lately.  See McCarthy Constr. 
Co., Nos. 7-CA-51474 & 7-CA-51647, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 10, 2010 WL 454506, at *1 (Feb. 2, 2010); 
supra text accompanying note 20.  
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summary affirmances.32  Moreover, partial adoption of ALJ decisions 
should be ended.  It is a confusing practice that demands a great deal of care 
from the reader to determine exactly what the Board is holding, as the 
Board may agree with parts of the ALJ’s conclusions and reasoning; reject 
other parts; or agree with the ALJ’s conclusions, but not its reasoning.33  If 
the Board feels that an issue needs a different approach than the ALJ pro-
vides, it should simply provide that approach itself.34  It would not have to 
reinvent the wheel, as it could still summarize the ALJ decision, but the 
practice of having part of the Board’s actual findings contained in a       
partially adopted ALJ decision is far too confusing. 
Minor issues with NLRB decisions exist as well.  For instance, the 
Board should significantly reduce its use of footnotes.  Any factual finding 
or legal conclusion should be in the text of a decision, as any material in a 
footnote seems trivial or an afterthought.35  This is especially true when the 
Board disagrees with the ALJ.36  Moreover, for the sake of an increasingly 
large group of judges who may not have the eyesight of their youth, the 
Board needs to increase the font size in its decisions.37  A minor point to be 
sure, but the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require 14-point sized 
font in appellate briefs for a reason.38 
One other possible reform is to identify the authors of NLRB deci-
sions, as is the practice in many court decisions.  Yet this reform may do 
more harm than good.  One argument for authorship is that Board members 
and their staffs may take more care when writing their decisions.  The    
danger, however, is that this care comes at the expense of speed.  For most 
Board decisions, the costs of delay are likely to outweigh any benefit of 
authorship,39 although exceptions may exist for major cases.  For instance, 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See, e.g., Greene v. NLRB, 321 F. App’x 816 (11th Cir. 2009); see also ABC Indus. Laundry, 
LLC, Nos. 28-CA-22133, 28-CA-22219 & 28-CA-22286, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 2010 WL 991195, at *2 
(Mar. 2, 2010); McCarthy Constr. Co., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 10, at *1; supra text accompanying notes 19-
20. 
 33 See, e.g., ABC Indus. Laundry, LLC, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 17, at *1 nn.4 & 6. 
 34 There may be limited instances in a case with multiple, yet straightforward, issues that the 
Board wants to adopt the ALJ decision except for a single (or a few) narrow issues.  If this is the case, 
the Board should, at a minimum, make it absolutely clear exactly what it is adopting and what it is not – 
including referring to section or page numbers in the ALJ decision. 
 35 There was often a joke among Board attorneys – unfortunately one more true than funny – that 
if you want to see what is important in an NLRB decision you must look to the footnotes. 
 36 See, e.g., Tower Auto. Operations USA I, Nos. 13-CA-44668 & 13-CA-44894, 355 N.L.R.B. 
No. 1, 2010 WL 454497, at *1 nn.5-6, 8-9 & 11 (Jan. 15, 2010) (overruling or refusing to adopt ALJ 
factual findings or credibility determinations).  
 37 The Board’s font size is so small, even those with good eyesight will feel the strain of reading 
after a while. 
 38 FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(5).  
 39 See supra note 9. 
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where there is a full Board decision or some other major issue at stake, 
identifying a decision’s author may provide an added degree of care that 
proves to be valuable.  Authorship is also unlikely to substantially affect the 
amount of time needed to release these cases as they are significant enough 
to be on their own schedule. 
One final aspect to the NLRB’s current decision format is that it may 
provide a perverse advantage.  Confusion may work to the Board’s benefit 
if courts are willing to look to the NLRB’s appellate attorneys as experts in 
deciphering Board decisions.  However, this is a remote benefit.  Judges are 
not accustomed to relying on attorneys as experts in interpreting decisions – 
that is the judges’ job.  More likely is that the judges view the NLRB’s con-
clusions as being as archaic and confused as its decisions.  A better        
approach, therefore, would be to write its decisions in a comprehensible 
manner that reflects well on the Board’s competence. 
B. Better Explanations 
Beyond the antiquated format of its decisions, one of the biggest prob-
lems for appellate review is the Board’s failure to adequately explain itself.  
There can be many reasons for this failure, from sloppiness to the gaps in 
logic that can result when insiders talk to each other, but the end result is a 
decision that – to an outsider at least – looks inadequately reasoned.  This is 
by no means a universal problem, as the Board often provides good expla-
nations.  However, this problem is not a rare one either; it is not unusual to 
see decisions that do a cursory, or worse, job of explaining how the Board 
reached a certain conclusion. 
This problem has not gone unnoticed by the Board.  In one case,   
Comcast Cablevision-Taylor,40 Member Acosta wrote a concurrence decry-
ing the Board’s failure to explain its current approach to an issue with in-
consistent Board precedent.41  An appellate court had reversed the Board in 
its original Comcast decision and the Board’s handling of that remand 
simply followed the court decision without addressing the underlying    
inconsistencies.  Member Acosta objected to this failure, stressing that it 
would lead to “confusion [that] may provide a basis for courts of appeals to 
deny enforcement in the future.”42 
                                                                                                                           
 40 338 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1089-90 (2003). 
 41 The issue involved whether a union’s grant of benefits – in Cablevision, a paid trip to a meeting 
valued at $50 – warranted setting aside an election.  Id. 
 42 Id. at 1089 (citing Owens-Illinois, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 1235 (1984) (overturning election based 
on $16 jackets)).  In the Board’s defense, it did not have an absolute need to clarify its position on pre-
election gifts in Comcast, as it was merely implementing the court’s decision in the remanded case.  Yet, 
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Failures of the Board to adequately explain its reasoning, like in   
Comcast, is an extremely serious problem.  In addition to making the Board 
look sloppy or disingenuous, the rules governing appellate review of     
administrative adjudication make incomplete reasoning a killer for NLRB 
decisions.  For instance, the Chenery rule prevents a court from enforcing 
an agency order on grounds that the agency itself did not rely upon.43  The 
rationale for Chenery is fairness to the parties and recognition that a court 
cannot adequately review a decision based on reasons not contained in the 
decision itself.44  As a result, the Board must always be cognizant of the fact 
that its appellate attorneys cannot invent arguments to defend what may 
well be a justified result; if an argument is not in the Board decision, it may 
as well not exist.  Making sure that it always adequately explains all of its 
reasoning would avoid forcing the Board’s appellate attorneys to create 
justifications, which – as courts are often quick to note – they are not sup-
posed to do under Chenery.45 
Even when Chenery is not an issue, providing more thorough explana-
tions would also reveal problems that may exist in the Board’s conclusions.  
At times – again, not the majority, but not so rare that it could be considered 
an aberration – the Board seems to reach a conclusion without having fully 
thought through whether it was justified.  Whether an attempt to compro-
mise the positions of Board members or a lack of thoroughness, some 
Board decisions that appear simple on their face are wrong once a full   
analysis is performed.  Other decisions may actually be correct, but seem 
wrong because of the Board’s cursory or confusing analysis.  Aside from 
fostering confusion, this superficial reasoning can cover up serious prob-
lems with the Board’s conclusion and create a reputation for the Board as 
being merely result-oriented. 
One example of the problems of inadequate explanations is the case 
Snyder’s of Hanover.46  In Snyder’s, the Board was faced with a last minute 
argument by the employer that it had the right to exclude union organizers 
from a public right-of-way because state property law gave adjoining land 
owners the power to exclude any use of public property unless that use is 
                                                                                                                           
as Member Acosta emphasized, there was little reason not to clarify the issue for the benefit of future 
parties or cases. 
 43 SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943). 
 44 Id. 
 45 The Board’s appellate attorneys typically refer to a rationale not explicitly contained in a Board 
decision as a “post hoc.”  Although a post hoc may be successful at times, they are particularly suscepti-
ble to a Chenery attack.  See, e.g., Smithfield Packing Co. v. NLRB, 510 F.3d 507, 519 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 46 Snyder’s of Hanover, 334 N.L.R.B. 183 (2001), enforcement denied in relevant part, 39 F. 
App’x 730 (3d Cir. 2002).  
2010] Defending the NLRB: Improving Success on Appeal 449 
 
specifically permitted by the relevant municipality.47  The Board correctly 
noted this state property rule, but did not apply it – instead, it brushed aside 
the employer’s argument, stating that the employer did not provide evi-
dence to support its right to exclude the union.48  However, the Third Circuit 
reversed, largely based on its own reading of the relevant state and local 
property law.  The court was particularly dismissive of the Board’s burden 
of proof conclusion, emphasizing that public records and judicial decisions 
were sufficient to address the employer’s defense.49  Although the employer 
had a colorable argument, the Board’s failure to substantively analyze the 
issue gave the employer a win it may not have deserved.  There were weak-
nesses with the employer’s argument that the Third Circuit did not address 
– for instance, two municipal officials had given the union permission to 
use the public land50 – largely because the Board itself did not address them.  
Had the Board engaged in more substantive analysis, the Third Circuit may 
have agreed with its conclusion or at least remanded to the Board to address 
some of the underlying issues in more detail. 
There is no quick fix to this problem.  The most important step would 
be to further emphasize the importance of fully reasoned decisions to the 
Board members’ staffs.  Having more Board staff attorneys with appellate 
experience would help as well.51  Board staff are no doubt aware that most 
Board decisions do not go to court.52  They also know well that the Board 
has the primary responsibility to interpret the NLRA and may take that role 
more seriously than is warranted given the Board’s lack of power to enforce 
its decisions.  The result, at times, is a failure to consider how a court may 
view the Board’s decision or how an appellate attorney will have to defend 
it.  The experience of having to defend a Board decision – particularly an 
inadequately or poorly reasoned one – will do much to illustrate the need to 
thoroughly explain the Board’s reasoning in all of its decisions.53 
This problem could also be aided by increasing the use of oral argu-
ments and invitations for amicus briefs in cases.  The Board often does this 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Id. at 183 n.4 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. Street, 63 Pa. D. & C. 2d 709 (1974)). 
 48 Id. at 184. 
 49 39 F. App’x at 734. 
 50 Snyder’s, 334 N.L.R.B. at 184. 
 51 The Board could provide such experience by hiring staff attorneys with appellate experience or 
using its “detail” program – basically a temporary transfer or visitorship – to give more Board-side 
attorneys appellate litigation experience. 
 52 See supra note 8. 
 53 See, e.g., Massey Energy Co., No. 9-CA-42057, 354 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 2009 WL 3149917, at *1 
(Sept. 30, 2009) (severing unfair labor practices cases against parent and subsidiary companies and, in 
finding subsidiary liable, failing to identify whether it was relying only on conduct of the subsidiary or 
of both companies, as the ALJ had found).   
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when it is considering a reversal of precedent,54 but other cases could also 
benefit from this approach.  The Board’s decisions in these cases are likely 
to benefit from more attention and input from interested parties.55  This in 
turn would improve the resulting decisions’ chances before the courts, both 
because of the decisions’ substantive quality and the perceived legitimacy 
with the process. 
C. Citing Appellate Court Cases in NLRB Decisions 
NLRB decisions, with some exceptions, have long been devoid of any 
mention of circuit court opinions.  This is the result of the Board’s view that 
it has the power to enforce the NLRA across the country; only Congress or 
the Supreme Court act as higher national authorities.56  Although technically 
true, this stance ignores the importance of appellate courts.  The Supreme 
Court, which is increasingly hostile to the Board,57 takes very few labor 
cases.  The appellate courts, therefore, serve as the court of last resort for 
virtually all NLRB cases.  Accordingly, although the Board can maintain its 
stance as the ultimate arbitrator of NLRA policy, until it has the power to 
enforce its own decisions, it is a paper tiger. 
Recognizing the important role of appellate courts in Board decisions 
has both practical and substantive benefits.  Practically, acknowledging the 
courts’ role will improve the Board’s credibility with the courts and make 
the agency appear less combative.  Substantively, regularly citing court 
decisions will improve the quality of Board decisions and highlight poten-
tial problems with court review while the Board still has a chance to       
address them. 
Citing to court decisions more often would also require the Board to 
be more explicit about when and why it disagrees with a court.  Although 
the Board is unlikely to change a court’s mind in a specific instance, de-
creasing the perception that it is “hiding the ball” from courts could only 
improve the Board’s credibility.58  Moreover, there may be instances where 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See, e.g., Notice of Oral Argument and Invitation to File Briefs, New York New York Hotel, 
LLC, Case No.28-CA-14519 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 4, 2007), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/foia/ 
NYNYHotelCasino/NoticeOfOralArgumentandInvitationtoFileBriefsdtd09042007.pdf.  Note, however, 
that the Supreme Court has recently held that an agency need not take extra steps when changing its 
precedent; the agency must still identify the change and show that the new policy is permissible, but it 
need not show that the new policy is better than the old one.  FCC v. Fox Tel. Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 
1800, 1811 (2009). 
 55 Estreicher, supra note 1, at 14 n.43. 
 56 Cf. Brudney, supra note 15, at 239 (noting, in discussion of nonaquiescence, Board’s “insist-
ence on its role as primary articulator of labor relations policy”). 
 57 Id. at 242. 
 58 See Flynn, supra note 2.  
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there is an apparent conflict with a previous court holding, but that a well-
reasoned Board decision could instead distinguish.  The NLRB’s appellate 
attorneys attempt to do this frequently, but often run into the problem of 
courts calling them out for “post-hoc” arguments.59  By establishing a     
policy of citing relevant court decisions, the Board would do a better job of 
identifying potential conflicts or appearances of conflicts, and have the   
opportunity to give its appellate attorneys more ammunition to avoid a 
court reversal. 
A practice of citing to court decisions would have other benefits as 
well.  For instance, if it adopted this practice, the Board would likely cite to 
the law of the circuit with jurisdiction over the geographic area in which the 
principal facts occurred.60  By so doing, the Board would help signal to the 
court, where applicable, that the other side engaged in forum shopping.61  
Citing relevant court decisions would also help the Board if it wanted to 
engage in more subtle or defensible forms of forum shopping, such as 
avoiding a circuit that is openly hostile to a specific Board rule at issue.62  
Finally, if there are different circuit rules at play, the Board could explicitly 
conclude that the General Counsel met its burden under all of them, thereby 
making the decision easier to defend in whatever circuit the case ends up.  
In short, citing to court decisions shows respect to the entities that are 
reviewing the Board.  It also allows the Board to eliminate conflicts that are 
unnecessary or unwarranted.  Moreover, when a conflict does occur, the 
practice would ensure that the Board addresses the problem directly.  The 
result would likely be an increase in courts’ approval of Board decisions. 
II.  EMPHASIZING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A further reform, which is related to improving the Board’s decisions, 
would be to make more of a concerted emphasis in appellate briefs and 
during oral argument to stress the deferential standard of review.63  The 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Smithfield Packing Co. v. NLRB, 510 F.3d 507, 519 (4th Cir. 2007); supra text accompa-
nying note 45. 
 60 The Board would also be wise to cite to D.C. Circuit precedent, as that court has jurisdiction 
over all NLRB cases, no matter where the facts took place.  29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (2006). 
 61 See infra Part III. 
 62 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f); Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 
(D.C. Cir. 2009); Industrial Turn Around Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2007); see infra 
note 72 and text accompanying notes 72-75; cf. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457, slip op. 
(U.S. June 17, 2010), rev’g 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009).   
 63 That standard can differ depending on the situation.  Generally, the Board is entitled to en-
forcement of decisions in which there is “substantial evidence” supporting its conclusions.  29 U.S.C. § 
160(e); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).  Courts also give increased defer-
ence to the Board’s representational findings – such as bargaining unit determinations and election 
objections – as the agency is perceived to have a particularly strong expertise in that area vis á vis 
 
452 FIU Law Review [5:437 
 
Board includes the appropriate standard of review in every appellate brief, 
and the courts are certainly aware of the need for deference to administra-
tive agencies, but some appellate decisions would leave a reasonable reader 
to believe that courts review NLRB decisions de novo. 
The review problem is often the result of the other issues discussed in 
this article.64  These reform efforts would hopefully minimize the number of 
times courts fail to give the Board the deference it is due, but a more effec-
tive approach would explicitly enhance the emphasis on the proper standard 
of review. 
There are various ways of stressing the standard more.  First, the 
standard of review section of NLRB briefs could be revamped to avoid the 
boring boilerplate language that is usually used and easily overlooked.65  By 
making those statements more forceful and targeted to a particular case, the 
Board could increase the likelihood that the court will take that standard 
seriously.66  That language should also use relevant appellate court citations.  
Second, more of an effort could be made to weave the standard of review 
throughout a brief’s argument section.  Third, Board attorneys could be 
more explicit and more consistent about raising the standard during oral 
argument.  Attorneys do not need to be overbearing or awkward in their 
emphasis on the standard of review.  Rather, it would take little effort to 
weave the standard into their descriptions of cases or, when acknowledging 
facts that go against the NLRB’s findings, note that the Board’s decision is 
still proper as long as there exists substantial evidence in support of its con-
clusions.  These strategies would make the standard of review more promi-
                                                                                                                           
courts.  NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946); Sitka Sound Seafoods, Inc. v. NLRB, 206 
F.3d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  Moreover, certain interpretations of the NLRA may be entitled to 
Chevron deference.  See, e.g., Snell Island SNF, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 415 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 64 It may also be the result of certain judges not caring much about the standard of review.  See 
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 363 (1998); Caterair Int’l v. NLRB, 22 
F.3d 1114, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see infra text accompanying notes 69-70. 
 65 To emphasize that I am writing on this issue with somewhat unclean hands, the following 
language from a brief I authored is a good example of a boilerplate statement of the standard of review: 
“The Board’s findings are ‘conclusive’ if they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole.  A reviewing court, therefore, may not displace the Board’s choice between conflicting views, 
‘even if the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.’”  
NLRB Appellate Brief, CSX Hotels, Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-2274, 03-
2432), 2004 WL 5230567. 
 66 While arguing cases for the NLRB, I was always thrilled to hear a judge bring up the standard 
of review during my opponent’s opening argument.  At that point, I knew my job was to make the 
quickest argument I could to avoid snatching defeat from the  jaws of what looked to be almost certain 
victory. 
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nent and hopefully result in judges respecting the Board’s conclusions more 
often. 67 
The risk of this strategy is that it could backfire.  It is possible that an 
emphasis on the standard of review could be seen by some judges as a sign 
of weakness or desperation.  In other words, a judge may see the Board’s 
stress on the standard of review as a signal that the decision cannot stand on 
its own legs.  Moreover, some judges may take offense at any statement that 
could be interpreted as suggesting that the Board’s conclusions are entitled 
to more weight than judges’. 
Although these risks are real, they could be lessened by a general, con-
sistent emphasis on the standard of review.  By making clear that it views 
agency deference as an important, and often ignored, part of its administra-
tive powers, the Board could limit some of this backlash.  It would no doubt 
still occur on occasion, but the hope is that the benefits outweigh the costs.  
The Board would also need to be careful not to blindly cite the need for 
deference without giving courts reason to think that deference is deserved.  
By explaining its decisions better and showing why its expertise is relevant 
to a given case,68 the Board’s stress on the importance of a      deferential 
standard of review would be more likely to receive a positive reception. 
Whether the benefits would materialize is not certain, however.  Espe-
cially when focusing on close or controversial cases, it is unclear whether a 
judge’s increased attention to agency deference would matter.  A judge may 
simply make the decision she feels is correct, no matter the standard.69    
Although this is no doubt true in some instances, it is also likely that other 
judges may be less willing to reverse the Board when they have the need for 
deference firmly in mind.70  It is impossible to quantify, but it appears that a 
long-term emphasis on the standard of review – particularly where the 
Board has also made reforms that help it to earn more respect – would give 
the agency more judicial deference than it enjoys today. 
                                                                                                                           
 67 The Board does this in many cases, but there appear to be many opportunities to make such an 
emphasis.  In short, the Board should consider emphasizing the standard of review as a matter of policy 
rather than on an ad hoc basis. 
 68 See supra Part I.B; Brudney, supra note 15, at 240. 
 69 See, e.g., Caterair Int’l v. NLRB, 22 F.3d 1114, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the Board 
“must affirmatively demonstrate [to the court] its consideration of the competing values at stake” before 
making an affirmative bargaining order despite acknowledging the particularly strong deference owed to 
the Board’s choice of remedies). 
 70 Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 364 (1998) (“While the Board’s 
adoption of a unitary standard for polling, RM elections, and withdrawals of recognition is in some 
respects a puzzling policy, we do not find it so irrational as to be ‘arbitrary [or] capricious’ within the 
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act.”). 
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III.  FORUM SHOPPING 
Another means by which the NLRB could increase its chances of    
appellate success is to avoid those courts that are most hostile to the Board.  
This “forum shopping” could take many forms; however, any attempt to 
target or to avoid a specific court of appeals would require a change of the 
Board’s current practice of avoiding even the hint of forum shopping.  
There are good reasons for the Board’s current policy, so a wholesale 
change to a more mercenary litigation strategy would not be wise.  Yet, a 
more limited practice of avoiding circuit law that directly conflicts with the 
NLRB’s policies may be warranted. 
Currently, the NLRB’s Appellate Court Branch typically follows the 
practice of waiting thirty days after the Board has issued a decision before 
seeking enforcement in a court of appeals.  This procedure gives the losing 
party the first opportunity to file an appeal and ensures that the agency does 
not appear to be shopping for a favorable circuit.  Similarly, when the 
NLRB does petition a court for enforcement of its orders, it files with the 
circuit having geographic jurisdiction over the area in which most of the 
central facts of a case occurred.  The sum of these practices is a very strong 
anti-forum shopping policy. 
This policy derives from the NLRB’s admirable desire to appear     
impartial and to avoid any appearance of gaming the courts.  That concern 
is also reflected in the NLRB’s brief writing and oral arguments, as appel-
late attorneys are instructed to act in a way that maintains the Board’s cred-
ibility as a repeat player before the courts and as a representative of the 
federal government.  These goals are well-justified and caution strongly 
against any change that may raise even a suggestion that the NLRB is     
basing its decisions where to file on a view that the judges of one court are 
more sympathetic to the Board than those of another. The Board’s anti-
forum shopping policy also avoids angering judges who would be offended 
by the appearance of an agency trying to seek more sympathetic courts.  
But not all forum-shopping policies raise these concerns. 
At times, the NLRB faces circuits that have established rules that      
directly contradict those of the NLRB and other circuits.71  If the NLRB 
continues to apply rules that certain circuits have rejected – using its “non-
acquiescence policy”72 – the Board’s anti-forum shopping policy causes 
serious problems.  By giving the losing party thirty days to file, the NLRB 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See, e.g., Industrial TurnAround Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 72 See Brudney, supra note 15, at 237-40; Rebecca Hanner White, Time for a New Approach: Why 
the Judiciary Should Disregard the “Law of the Circuit” When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the 
National Labor Relations Board, 69 N.C. L. REV. 639, 639-40 (1991); see generally Samuel Estreicher 
& Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989). 
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is literally giving away these cases; the party will almost certainly file with 
the circuit that has stated that it will not enforce the exact type of Board 
decision at issue.73  It does not undermine the NLRB’s neutrality or credibil-
ity to actively avoid a court that will, with certainty, reverse the Board.  To 
do otherwise wastes the NLRB’s time and, more importantly, allows      
employees to suffer what the agency has already deemed a violation of the 
NLRA without remedy. 
Indeed, the Board has recently been faced with the most serious type 
of this problem.  The D.C. Circuit – which has jurisdiction over any NLRB 
decision, no matter where the facts occurred74 – held all NLRB cases in 
abeyance until the Supreme Court addressed whether the Board could issue 
decisions with only two members.75  This problem was solved with the  
recent appointments of new Board members, but it was a severe issue for 
the twenty-six months during which the Board had only two members – and 
the problem could soon arise again.76  No matter the reasons to avoid forum 
shopping in normal circumstances, there was no sense in allowing losing 
parties to file petitions for review in the D.C. Circuit, knowing that nothing 
would happen until more Board members were appointed or the Supreme 
Court resolved the issue.  As soon as the D.C. Circuit held that the two-
member decisions were invalid – and certainly as soon as the court        
announced it was holding NLRB cases in abeyance – the NLRB should 
have established a policy of filing quickly for enforcement in circuits that 
were actually considering Board cases.77 
Beyond the cases with the most obvious conflicts, the NLRB should 
also consider avoiding circuits that are openly hostile to its law on certain 
issues.  For instance, the Sixth Circuit, before being reversed by the        
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 254. 
 74 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (2006). 
 75 Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc., v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding 
that NLRB does not have authority to issue two-member decisions); cf. New Process Steel, L.P. v. 
NLRB, No. 08-1457, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010), rev’g 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
NLRB lacked authority to issue decisions under delegated two-member Board).  
 76 See Stephen Greenhouse, Deadlock is Ending on Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, at 
B1. 
 77 The First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits all agreed that two-member NLRB 
decision were valid; thus, the Board could have filed cases in at least those circuits and possibly the 
remaining circuits that had not addressed the issue yet.  See Narricot Indus., LP v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654, 
659 (4th Cir. 2009); Snell Island SNF L.L.C. v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 423-24 (2d Cir. 2009); New Pro-
cess Steel, L.P., 564 F.3d 840, 845-46 (2009), rev’d, No. 08-1457, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010); Ne. 
Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2009).  Eventually, the NLRB seemed to avoid the 
D.C. Circuit, as it began not to wait the normal 30 days before filing in the circuit in which the majority 
of facts took place.  See Appellate Court Branch Briefs and Motions (showing lack of D.C. Circuit 
appellate cases following Laurel Baye), http://www.nlrb.gov/research/appellate_court_briefs_and_ 
motions.aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2010). 
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Supreme Court, used to hold that the NLRB’s General Counsel bore the 
burden of proving that a worker was not an excluded supervisor under the 
NLRA.78  This contrasted with the approach of the Board and other circuits, 
which placed the burden on the party arguing that a worker was a supervi-
sor.79  Although the Board would not automatically lose a supervisor case 
before the Sixth Circuit, the court’s rule was dissimilar enough to the 
Board’s interpretation of the NLRA that avoiding the Sixth Circuit in     
supervisor cases would have been warranted. 
This type of case, although not technically raising the Board’s 
nonaquiescence policy, may be considered “nonacquiescence light.”80  Such 
cases involve issues in which courts, although not fully contradicting Board 
law, are hostile to the Board’s rulings.  Avoiding those courts in cases rais-
ing such issues has more justification than forum shopping that merely tries 
to increase the Board’s odds of winning.  Instead, these cases involve situa-
tions in which the Board is very likely to lose.  It would not significantly 
affect the Board’s reputation to file with other courts under such circum-
stances.81 
IV.  RULEMAKING 
The NLRB is unique among administrative agencies in its use of adju-
dication rather than formal rulemaking.  Much has been written about the 
NLRB’s failure to use rulemaking and its effect on NLRA enforcement, and 
this article will not repeat that literature.82  However, it is worth examining 
how an increased use of rulemaking might influence court review of NLRB 
cases. 
Despite its authority to issue rules, the NLRB has steadfastly refused 
to do so in all but the narrowest of circumstances.83  One theory for this 
practice is that the reliance on adjudication rather than rulemaking improves 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. v. NLRB, 193 F.3d 444, 453 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 532 U.S. 706, 
711 (2001). 
 79 NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 711 (2001). 
 80 Another example involves the Board’s disagreement with courts, particularly the D.C. Circuit, 
regarding when affirmative bargaining orders are appropriate.  See Brudney, Victory, supra note 2, at 
1012 n.237 (citing cases). 
 81 The Board may well irritate these courts, although they have already shown hostility to the 
NLRB’s decisions, so any additional irritation is unlikely to make a significant impact on the Board’s 
success rate. 
 82 See, e.g., William B. Gould IV, New Labor Law Variations of an Old Theme: Is the Employee 
Free Choice Act the Answer?, 70 LA. L. REV. 1, 42-44 (2009) (citing past articles); Mark H. Grunewald, 
The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274 (1991); Samuel Estrei-
cher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163 (1985). 
 83 Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 608, 609, 620 (1991) (approving NLRB health-care 
bargaining-unit rule as valid exercise of authority under Section 6 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 156 
(2006)). 
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the Board’s success before the courts of appeals, as it “hides the ball” – that 
is, the Board is able to hide controversial policy judgments under the guise 
of fact finding.84  As the NLRB learned when it tried to implement a rule 
establishing a presumption that single-facility bargaining units were appro-
priate, Congress also tends to notice proposed rules more than adjudicatory 
holdings.85  Thus, the NLRB has reasonably been wary of relying on rules 
to issue policy. 
Rulemaking, especially for an agency that is relatively new to the 
practice, would also consume a significant amount of resources.86  Funding 
is almost always a serious issue for the NLRB, so even if it wanted to    
engage in more rulemaking, its power to do so would be constrained. 
Despite these reasons for avoiding rules in certain instances, there are 
potential benefits from at least limited rulemaking.  For instance, establish-
ing clear rules that apply in specific, narrow circumstances would lend an 
air of legitimacy that adjudication often lacks.87  In particular, where the 
Board decides to reverse its previous law, doing so through rulemaking – 
where appropriate – could increase courts’ willingness to defer to the 
Board’s change.88  Much of the advantage in these instances derives from a 
more thorough explanation of the Board’s reasons for a policy and a more 
explicit recognition of competing views on an issue.89  This explanatory 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See Flynn, supra note 2, at 405-13; see also Gould, supra note 82, at 29 (citing decision to 
grant backpay to undocumented workers in Hoffman Plastics).  Indeed, adjudications that go against 
unions in representation cases are, unlike rulemaking, totally immune from court review.  Catherine L. 
Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with its Structure and 
Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2068 (2009) (noting that employees and 
union cannot challenge the Board’s representation decisions).  The Board may try to hide policy deci-
sions from Congress in a similar manner.  Estreicher, Improving, supra note 1, at 12. 
 85 After the NLRB proposed a rule to establish a presumption that single-location bargaining units 
were presumptively appropriate, Congress attached several riders to the NLRB’s budget prohibiting the 
spending of funds to promulgate the rule.  See Unified Agenda, National Labor Relations Board, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 63,528, 63,528-29 (Nov. 29, 1996).  Eventually, the NLRB withdrew its notice of proposed rule-
making.  See Unified Agenda, National Labor Relations Board, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,036, 23,036-37 (Apr. 
27, 1998).  
 86 This is especially true given that the NLRB is banned from hiring economic analysts.  29 
U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006) (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint indi-
viduals . . . for economic analysis.”). 
 87 Gould, supra note 82, at 43. 
 88 Estreicher, supra note 1, at 14.  Some situations are so context-dependent that adjudication is 
more appropriate than rulemaking.   
 89 Brudney, supra note 15, at 235-36 (noting that rulemaking “encourages the collection and 
analysis of information at a more complete and sophisticated level”).  The NLRB often does provide 
opposing parties’ views in cases, particularly significant ones.  However, this is still less useful than 
rulemaking because it only includes the views of parties (and amici in limited circumstances), rather 
than the broader set of views usually associated with rulemaking.  Also, courts are more used to seeing 
opposing views as part of the rulemaking process; the courts are less familiar with the Board’s custom, 
which is likely to reduce their respect for the NLRB’s process. 
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power would likely provide Board rules with increased deference from 
courts.  Rulemaking’s increased predictability may also reduce the hostility 
that some courts exhibit towards the Board’s adjudications. 
Examples of issues that could lend themselves to rulemaking, particu-
larly in the Board’s initial attempts, include requiring postings that notify 
employees of certain labor rights,90 promulgating remedial rules,91 and    
establishing basic guidelines for elections and other representational is-
sues.92  With these rules in place, the NLRB could then focus on applying 
its policies to the facts of cases before it – a practice that is particularly 
suited for adjudication. 
Despite these potential advantages, courts or Congress could still      
reject the NLRB’s rules.  However, given courts’ willingness to reverse 
NLRB decisions, this risk does not seem worse than the status quo.93  
Moreover, by engaging in formal rulemaking, courts would have to apply 
the Supreme Court’s Chevron rule which, although not foolproof, could 
provide more deference than the Board usually enjoys.94  Thus, the Board 
should consider rulemaking in certain instances as one option for protecting 
its decisions from court reversal.  It is a strategy that comes with costs, but 
if used wisely, it may provide substantial benefits. 
                                                                                                                           
 90 These notices could include narrow ones, such as the recently implemented one notifying 
employees of their right to seek decertification of a union that an employer recently voluntarily recog-
nized, see Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 443 (2007), or a more general posting notifying employees of 
their general NLRA rights, see Jeffrey M, Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of 
Discourse in the Regulation of Collective Action, UC DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), manuscript at 
62-63, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1553031).  In 1992, the Board proposed a rule 
that would notify employees of their “Beck” rights not to pay all union dues in some circumstances.  See 
57 Fed. Reg. 43, 635 (Sept. 22, 1992); see also Commc’ns Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).  
However, the Board later rescinded the notice of proposed rulemaking.  See 61 Fed. Reg. 11, 167 (Mar. 
19, 1996). 
 91 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 644, 650 (2007) (prohibiting make-whole     
remedy for employees terminated for misconduct discovered by unlawful employer surveillance). 
 92 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 262, 302 (2008) (arguing for expansion of Excelsior lists for employees’ e-mail addresses); Estrei-
cher, Oscillation, supra note 82, at 172-74 (arguing for rules to simplify bargaining unit determinations 
and when to issue bargaining orders).  See generally NLRB v. Wyman-Gordan Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763-
64, 772 (1969) (affirming Exclesior and holding that Board can issue rules through formal rulemaking 
or adjudication). 
 93 See Flynn, supra note 2, at 419-20, 433-34 (noting that Board’s practice of hiding rules through 
adjudication can produce hostile reaction from courts, although also noting the risk that rulemaking is an 
easy target for courts). 
 94 But see Flynn, supra note 2, at 438 (arguing that Chevron provides similar deference to the 
traditional standard of review – “rational and consistent” with the NLRA – for NLRB policymaking); 
see also Michael Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor Relations Board’s Lawmaking in the 
Age of Chevron and Brand X, 89 B.U. L. REV. 189, 191 (2009) (arguing that courts should use a height-
ened “arbitrary and capricious” review in some circumstances, particularly where the NLRB’s rules 
change). 
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V.  REDUCING DELAY 
Delays in the NLRB’s issuance of decisions is a further concern for the 
Board’s ability to successfully defend its cases in court.  In addition to    
diminishing its credibility,95 in certain cases courts expressly cite delay as a 
reason to refuse to enforce a Board order.96 
The time it takes the NLRB to investigate and adjudicate an unfair   
labor practice charge is considerable.97  In Fiscal Year 2009, it took on    
average 483 days from the filing of a charge to the issuance of an NLRB 
decision.98  However, the delay can be much longer; for example, the cases 
still awaiting decisions at the end of Fiscal Year 2009 had been pending on 
average for 963 days since the issuance of the charge.99 
This delay can directly impact the Board’s success in the courts of     
appeals.  Indeed, the courts frequently call out the Board for its delay, often-
times resulting in reversals.100  This is particularly true for affirmative bar-
gaining orders, in which courts will often rely on the passage of time to 
refuse to enforce the Board’s remedy.101  These bargaining cases show the 
double-edged sword of delay; not only does the time it takes to litigate a 
case undermine a union’s ability to maintain support from employees, but 
even if a union can keep the support, the bargaining remedy may ultimately 
be overturned.102 
The NLRB has been working at reducing delay over the last several 
years, with some success.103  Yet, more could be done.  One recurring issue 
has been the amount of time during which the NLRB has lacked its full 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See generally Samuel Estreicher & Matthew T. Bodie, Administrative Delay at the NLRB: 
Some Modest Proposals, 23 J. LAB. RES. 87 (2002); John C. Truesdale, Battling Case Backlogs at the 
NLRB: The Continuing Problem of Delays in Decision Making and the Clinton Board’s Response, 16 
LAB. LAW. 1 (2000). 
 96 See, e.g., NLRB v. Thill, 980 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 97 Delay is a serious issue with representation cases, but because representation issues only reach 
courts of appeals via unfair labor practice charges, the focus here will be on those cases. 
 98 74 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 152 (2010) (median days). 
 99 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 98.  
 100 See Wilma B. Liebman & Peter J. Hurtgen, The Clinton Board(s) – A Partial Look from Within, 
16 LAB. LAW. 43, 45-46 (2000) (citing decisions noting the Board’s “snail-like pace” and “cavalier 
disdain for the hardships it is causing,” and that its delay is a “dilatory virus”); see also Thill, 980 F.2d at 
1142, 1143 (rejecting bargaining order because of nine-year delay, and calling Board the “Rip Van 
Winkle” of administrative agencies). 
 101 See Thill, 980 F.2d at 1142. 
 102 See supra note 9. 
 103 The delay from the filing of a charge to issuance of a decision was a median 483 days in fiscal 
year 2009 and 559 days in 2008.  74 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 152 (2009); 73 
NLRB ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at (2009). 
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complement of five members.104  Even when at full strength, however, there 
still remains a need to further reduce the delay in issuing decisions.         
Options to address this need include setting internal limits on the amount of 
time a Board member is permitted to issue an assigned decision and giving 
the Chairperson the power to reassign cases away from members who do 
not meet those deadlines.105  If funding were less of an issue, increased 
staffing would help as well. 
The problems of delay are by no means limited to the Board’s appel-
late success.  But when considering its priorities, both budgetary and     
policy-wise, the Board should take into account the negative impact that 
delay has on its ability to defend its cases before the courts of appeals.  If it 
wants its orders to be enforced – especially its bargaining orders – it should 
intensify its attempts to reduce the amount of time that it takes to handle 
cases.  
VI.  10(E) MOTIONS 
In addition to the delay involved while the Board is considering a case, 
the time an appellate court takes to hear a case can also be a significant 
issue.  The NLRA provides the Board with an option to mitigate the effects 
of such delay by seeking injunctive relief under Section 10(e).106  This op-
tion could not only provide faster relief for the victims of unfair labor prac-
tices, but also improve the Board’s chance of success once a full appellate 
decision is issued. 
A Section 10(e) motion seeks a preliminary injunction from a court; 
for instance, an injunction requiring an employer to continue to bargain 
with a union while the court is considering a Section 8(a)(5) unfair labor 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc., v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(holding that NLRB does not have authority to issue two-member decisions); cf. New Process Steel, L.P. 
v. NLRB, No. 08-1457, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010), rev’g 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the NLRB lacked authority to issue decisions under delegated two-member Board). 
 105 Estreicher, Improving, supra note 1, at 12.  The view that the Board has become increasingly 
partisan may also cause delay and create less respect from the courts; however, there is not much that 
the Board itself can realistically do about this problem, given that members may be chosen specifically 
because they are highly partisan.  See James J. Brudney, Recrafting a Trojan Horse: Thoughts on Work-
place Governance in Light of Recent British Labor Law Developments, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
193, 205 (2007); Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the 
National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 579 n.71 (2007) (citing increased 
politicization of NLRB, which results in more vacancies, more turnover, and more delay); Truesdale, 
supra note 95. 
 106 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2006); see also John G. Adam, Achieving Compliance with NLRB-Ordered 
Remedies, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 323, 326-27 (1998); Charles J. Morris, Renaissance at the NLRB 
– Opportunity and Prospect for Non-Legislative Procedural Reform at the Labor Board, 23 STETSON L. 
REV. 101, 123-27 (1993). 
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practice finding.107  Along with Section 10(j) motions,108 the district court 
injunction equivalent, Section 10(e) injunctive relief is a means for the 
Board to avoid some of the problems associated with its lack of authority to 
enforce its orders.109  Moreover, seeking Section 10(e) injunctive relief may 
not only aid the enforcement of the NLRA while a case is pending, but 
could also enhance a case’s ultimate chance of success before a court by 
providing a signal that the Board’s reasoning is strong and the issues      
involved are significant.  Therefore, it is curious that although the NLRA 
explicitly authorizes such motions, the NLRB is reticent to seek injunctive 
relief from appellate courts, even less so than the underutilized Section 
10(j)  relief.110   Indeed,  Section  10(e)  motions  have  been  virtually  non-
existent over the last few years.111 
One reality that has played into this reticence is the fact that appellate 
courts are resistant to granting Section 10(e) motions, despite the relatively 
low threshold for justifying such relief.112  The Board has attempted at times 
to file more Section 10(e) motions, but often without success.113  For exam-
ple, in several cases before the D.C. Circuit, the Board argued that Section 
10(e) orders were justified because of the Board’s high win rate in the type 
of cases involved and the significant harm of delay.114  The court, however, 
was unmoved.115  The reason for this resistance is not entirely clear, but 
probably results in part from the typical duties of the courts of appeals.116  
                                                                                                                           
 107 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). 
 108 Id. § 160(j); see also WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE 
NLRB 65-67, 178-82, 300-02 (2000) (discussing importance of Section 10(j) relief). 
 109 See Morris, supra note 106, at 115-16. 
 110 See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Prob-
lems with its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2028-30 (2009) 
(discussing use of Section 10(j) motions, showing significant decline from1970s to 2000s). 
 111 74 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, 149 (2010) (zero Section 10(e) motions; twen-
ty-seven Section 10(j) motions); 73 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2008, 135 (2009) (zero 
Section 10(e) motions; twenty-one Section 10(j) motions); 72 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 
2007, 181 (2008) (three Section 10(e) motions; twenty-one Section 10(j) motions). 
 112 The requirements for Section 10(e) or Section 10(j) relief are usually less than a typical prelim-
inary injunction, which requires a showing of irreparable harm; the Board instead need only show that 
there is reasonable cause that the NLRA was violated and that temporary relief will serve the remedial 
purposes of the Act.  Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 113 See 64 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 159 (2000) (noting two Section 10(e) 
filings, neither of which were granted).  However, the most recent year in which the Board sought Sec-
tion 10(e) relief, they won all three times.  72 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 181 
(2008).  If the Board were more aggressive about seeking such relief, that win rate would likely be 
lower. 
 114 See, e.g., All Seasons Climate Control, Inc. v. NLRB, 236 F. App’x 636 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
Interstate Waste Servs. of N.J., Inc. v. NLRB, 236 F. App’x 636 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 115 All Seasons, 236 F. App’x 636; Interstate Waste Servs., 236 F. App’x 637. 
 116 Political resistance to a more aggressive NLRB enforcement strategy is also a possible factor.  
See James J. Brudney, Reflections of Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 
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These courts are appellate in nature; they primarily review lower-court and 
agency decisions by reading opposing briefs, holding oral arguments, and 
issuing written decisions.  Motions for preliminary appellate injunction are 
not typical and, as a result, appellate courts are less likely to be open to 
requests for such relief.  That said, injunctive motions are not totally alien 
to these courts and a concerted effort by the NLRB to seek more Section 
10(e) relief could help courts become more comfortable with the process. 
Yet, if the NLRB does file more Section 10(e) motions, it is not clear 
what effect those motions might have on the Board’s ultimate success in the 
cases involved or cases in which they do not seek motions.  It is possible 
that a well-reasoned strategy by the Board could help to flag cases that are 
strong on the facts and involve orders that are particularly susceptible to the 
harms of delay – thereby leading courts to side with the Board more often 
in the ultimate disposition.117  On the other hand, there is a risk that if the 
Board begins to file a substantial number of Section 10(e) motions, cases in 
which the Board did not file for such relief motion will be viewed by courts 
as weaker.  Despite this risk, the Board should seriously consider seeking 
Section 10(e) relief more often. 
At a minimum, the Board should routinely file Section 10(e) motions 
in cases in which it received Section 10(j) relief from a district court and 
there are no new circumstances weighing against such relief.  These cases 
typically involve bargaining orders or other types of relief that can be     
undermined by the passage of time, and success before a district court pro-
vides the Board with more than enough justification to seek identical relief 
before a court of appeals.118  The Board could also seek injunctive relief in 
cases involving multiple or serious unfair labor practices and a significant 
passage of time.  Filing Section 10(e) motions in such cases would be a 
means of emphasizing the harm that the alleged victims continue to face 
and hopefully make the court at least somewhat sympathetic to the Board’s 
                                                                                                                           
1593 n.124 (1996) (discussing political backlash to NLRB’s increased focus on Section 10(j) motions).  
Delay before the case was brought to the appellate court can also be an issue.  Ex-Cell-O Corp., 449 
F.2d at 1053 (citing union and NLRB delay). 
 117 Cases involving bargaining orders are among those in which delay is particularly harmful.  See 
supra note 9.  Also, if Section 10(e) motions are limited to only the strongest of cases – those in which 
the Board would presumably win anyone – there is little advantage from a final win-loss view to filing 
for Section 10(e) relief. 
 118 See Charles J. Morris, Deterring 8(a)(3) Discharges with 10(J) Injunctions: Professor Morris’ 
Comments on the Katz et al. Commentary, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 75, 76 (2000) (arguing that the 
Board should seek Section 10(j) relief in all discriminatory discharge cases); Samuel Estreicher, Labor 
Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 36 (1993) (arguing for 
amendment to Section 10(j) to make clear that injunction is available to reinstate discharged employ-
ees). 
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desire to have its order enforced.119  These motions are unlikely to have a 
dramatic effect, but for an agency whose value often seems to be ques-
tioned, they represent one of several strategies that could enhance the 
Board’s standing among the courts of appeals.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The NLRB’s success in the courts of appeals is by no means the    
agency’s most pressing issue.  It is, however, one that often appears to be 
overlooked.  This is unfortunate, as a consistent and wide-reaching effort to 
improve its win rate in court would have many beneficial side effects.  
Keeping appellate review in mind while writing NLRB decisions, in partic-
ular, would add much value to the Board’s adjudicatory efforts.  Other    
strategies – such as emphasizing deference, avoiding overtly hostile courts, 
using more rulemaking, reducing delay, and seeking more injunctive relief 
– would also enhance the Board’s standing before the courts and possibly 
with other audiences as well.   
Appellate review is only one of many steps in NLRB litigation, but in 
many cases it is the final one.  Without court approval in these cases, all 
that has occurred before may be for naught.  Thus, to preserve the Board’s 
efforts to enforce the NLRA and to increase its credibility as an agency, it is 
vital that the Board focus on what is needed to achieve success in the courts 
of appeals. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Despite the appellate courts criticism of NLRB delay, the courts are not immune from this 
problem.  Seeking 10(e) relief, while possibly being seen as overly critical, could also push courts to act 
faster in certain cases. 
